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Should we take into account an artist’s personal moral failings when appreciating or
evaluating the work? In this essay, I seek to expand Berys Gaut’s account of ethicism by
showing how moral judgment of an artist’s private moral actions can gure in one’s
overall evaluation of their work. To expand Gaut’s view, I argue that the artist’s
personal morality is relevant to our evaluation of their work because we may only
come to understand the point of view of the work, and therefore the work’s prescribed
attitude, by examining the values, attitudes, and behaviors of the artist. This view is
defended against a rival account o ered by Bernard Wills and Jason Holt, which holds
that the artistic evaluation of an artist’s work is independent from the moral evaluation
of their life except in extreme cases.
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1. Introduction
As a child growing up in the 1970s and 1980s, I was a big fan of Bill Cosby. My
childhood was lled with many of his shows: Fat Albert and the Cosby Kids, Picture
Pages, and The Cosby Show. In 1983, Cosby released a lm of his stand-up routine,
titled Bill Cosby: Himself. My family owned a copy on VHS that I must have watched
dozens of times. Cosby was funny and intelligent, but also seemed like a kind man. He
was “America’s dad.”
Recently, Cosby has been convicted of sexual assault and aggravated indecent assault.
The allegations against Cosby include charges of rape, drug-facilitated sexual assault,
and child sexual assault. The accusations come from sixty women, two of which were
fteen years old at the time of the assaults, that begin as early as the 1960s.[1]
Should Cosby’s fans revise their previous positive assessment of his shows? Is one’s
experience of watching his shows changed because of what we now know of the man?
Is it now wrong for one to enjoy watching his old shows? While the case of Cosby might
be the most recent, the issue is a general one. Audience members experience a deep
sense of con ict when they discover that a once-beloved artist is guilty of some moral
transgression. The source of the con ict is understandable; we might cherish our
aesthetic experience of the artist’s work while we detest the person of the artist. How
do we, or should we, negotiate this sense of con ict? How can we hate the person but
love their creation? Why do we sometimes feel compelled to “aesthetically divorce” the
artist and his or her work, while at other times we extend a hand of forgiveness?
Discussion of how fans should think about such artists has exploded in the popular
media recently. While many call for bans and boycotts of morally problematic artists,
others insist that we must separate the artist’s life from their work. Many of the
discussions in the popular media are lacking in much nuance and woefully unhelpful.
Turning to the work of philosophers, few have focused speci cally on what possible
impact the artist’s private life could have on the appreciation of their works. However,
related discussions of whether the moral evaluation of a work’s content should play
some role in our appreciation of art have a long history.[2] Many following a broadly
Kantian tradition, including the formalism of Clive Bell and the later “aesthetic attitude”
theorists, argue that we should never judge a work by some moral measure and that
we act mistakenly when we do so. Kant’s argument that judgments of moral goodness
prohibit viewers from taking a disinterested stance toward aesthetic objects is familiar
to many.[3] It is not di cult to see how this thought would be extended to moral
judgments of the artist’s personal life. Why deny ourselves the joy of appreciating an
artist’s work simply because we do not like their personal failings? A recent, though
limited, account of this view is o ered by Bernard Wills and Jason Holt.[4] They argue
that aesthetic judgments about an artist’s work are independent from moral
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judgments of the artist’s life, except in the most extreme cases. I will return to consider
and ultimately reject this view, in section 3.
Against this Kantian tradition, many philosophers have argued that we cannot and
should not separate moral matters from aesthetic matters, and chief among these are
the many feminist aestheticians who have sought to draw attention to the
inseparability of these issues.[5] Yet even within the literature on feminist aesthetics, it
is unusual to focus on what contribution the private lives of artists might make to our
aesthetic engagement with their works. Rather, it is more common to nd discussion of
the moral relevance of the work’s content itself and the role that our moral judgment
should play in reference to its aesthetics. These are deeply important topics, but they
do not address the questions I raise here.
In this paper, I want to defend the claim that an artist’s private life is a relevant concern
when evaluating their work. The kind of cases that interest me are those where the
viewer can nd no direct trace of the artist’s deeds in their works. For instance, in cases
like Bill Cosby: Himself, there is no indication of anything sinister in the lm. Why, then,
should our knowledge of the man’s deeds force us to reevaluate our aesthetic
appreciation of the lm? Here is a brief outline of what follows. Section 2 examines the
nature of the question more closely. I distinguish three di erent questions that can be
asked of the cases I am interested in and argue that the answers to each of those
questions are independent of the others. Section 3 examines Wills and Holt’s view that
moral judgments are independent from aesthetic judgments except in extreme cases.
Their account is rejected for failing to o er a principled reason to admit exceptions.
Section 4 examines Berys Gaut’s in uential defense of ethicism, which holds that the
evaluation of a work’s moral content is relevant to one’s aesthetic evaluation of the
work.[6] However, Gaut’s account is limited as it stands; it focuses on the work’s
contents, not on the artist’s private life. So, in section 5, I o er an amendment to Gaut’s
account that would allow it to be extended to our target. In section 6, I return to Wills
and Holt’s essay to consider some general objections that they o er and demonstrate
how such objections can be addressed by the view proposed here.
2. Three problems
The problem we are after is not one problem. In fact, there are at least three di erent
problems, and a solution to one may have little impact on the others. It is not my
intention to address all three problems in this essay. I would be happy if I could say
something intelligent about any one.
The rst problem concerns the nature of aesthetic experience: Does the personal
morality of an artist have any aesthetic impact on one’s experience of the work? We
can call this the experiential question. There are some cases where the identity of the
author and knowledge of his or her immoral acts will have an aesthetic impact on one’s
experience of their work. For instance, consider the self portraits produced by the
serial killer John Wayne Gacy, while he was in prison awaiting his execution, that depict
Gacy wearing his Pogo the Clown costume. When viewed without knowledge of their
provenance, many of the paintings appear amateurish, at, and lacking in any
meaningful depth, but, when viewed with the knowledge that they are the work of
Gacy, they take on a creepy, disturbing quality. For these works, their aesthetic
character is partly shaped by one’s knowledge of the artist’s life. But there are also
many cases where there seems to be little aesthetic impact or, at least, cases where the
aesthetic impact is debatable. For instance, consider the work of the British sculptor
Eric Gill. Earning admiration for his religious sculptures and design work in the early
twentieth century, it was revealed long after Gill’s death that he had sexually abused
his daughters, held incestuous relationships with his sisters, and had engaged in sexual
acts with the family dog.[7] In discussions of Gill’s work, there is much debate over
attempts to tie their aesthetic character to any facet of his private life. Some are able to
view his works innocently while others claim to be incapable of doing so.[8]
The experiential question is fascinating in its own right and of great importance to
aesthetics. Unfortunately, I have little to say about it. While it is possible to nd
instances of both sorts, those where the character of the work is changed by
knowledge of the artist’s life and those where it is not, I can discern no relevant
di erence to explain why. I draw attention to the experiential question only to pass
over it.
The second problem, which will be the focus of this essay, is a normative question
about aesthetic evaluation: Should we take into account an artist’s moral failings when
evaluating their works as art? We can call this the evaluative question. Again, there
seem to be cases that suggest both positive and negative answers. For instance, it
seems right to critically evaluate the works of William S. Burroughs with the knowledge
of his murder of his wife, Joan Vollmer, in 1951. Burroughs’ guilt over Vollmer’s death
served as an impetus for much of his work, particularly his short novel Queer. By
contrast, it also seems right that the critical appreciation of Caravaggio’s work is not
changed by the knowledge of the artist’s murder of Ranuccio Tomassoni. However, at
this early stage in the investigation, these observations are little more than intuitions. I
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will later o er a positive answer to the evaluative question but, for now, it is enough to
acknowledge the con ict of our intuitions.
Importantly, our answer to the evaluative question need not depend on our answer to
the experiential question, and vice versa. The reason for this is because the two
questions fall on either side of an “is/ought” divide. The fact that aesthetic experience
works in a particular way does not suggest how aesthetic judgment ought to work. The
two are related of course, but the relation is complex. One could answer the
experiential question positively but answer the evaluative question negatively. For
instance, one might hold that knowledge of the artist’s life indeed a ects the character
of one’s aesthetic experience of their work, but this is a mistake when it comes to
evaluating their work. We would do better to disregard our moral feelings and focus
our aesthetic judgment solely on matters of technique, skill, and intention.
Alternatively, one could answer the experiential question negatively but answer the
evaluative question positively. On this account, knowledge of the artist’s life has no
impact on the character of one’s aesthetic experience of their work, but this is a
mistake. Taking into account the artist’s private life in our judgment of their work o ers
the best, considered evaluation. These mixed positions on the two questions are not
on the surface implausible.
A third problem is another normative question about our engagement with an artist’s
works: Is it morally wrong to engage with the work of an immoral artist? Call this the
engagement question. Prior to his incarceration, would it have been wrong for me to
buy tickets to see Cosby’s stand-up routine? One might argue that patronizing Cosby
then would have helped him fund his legal defense, which is wrong to do. But, consider
a less immediate case. Would it be wrong of me now to watch my family’s old copy of
Bill Cosby: Himself? In this case, there is no direct patronage that Cosby bene ts from,
but one might argue that watching Bill Cosby: Himself now is insensitive to his victims
or that my watching it now demonstrates a tolerance of his crimes on my part, which
itself is morally reprehensible.
I think there is important work to be done regarding the audiences’ responsibilities for
their engagement with art, which is an under-explored issue in aesthetics. But again,
my focus in this essay is on the evaluative question. I have little to say about the
engagement question here, except that how we answer it question is not dependent
on how we answer either the experiential question or the evaluative question.[9] Even
if we were to answer both previous questions positively, the engagement question
remains open. In some cases, perhaps it is wrong and I should not go see Cosby’s
stand-up routine, while in other cases, perhaps it is not and I am still free to enjoy Bill
Cosby: Himself.
3. Aesthetic independence, with exceptions
Recently, Wills and Holt have argued for the separation of art from life. While there are
likely to be other arguments for such a separation available, I take Wills and Holt’s view
to be representative of such accounts.
Wills and Holt’s position attempts to capture two intuitions that they describe as
“su ciently rm if not absolutely solid:” “that aesthetic judgment is independent of
moral judgment, and that this independence is not absolute but can legitimately be
challenged in some instances” (§2). The view that aesthetic judgments are independent
from moral judgments often goes by the name of ‘autonomism,’ which justi ably
describes their position.[10] Wills and Holt allow that moral judgment can play some
role in the appreciation of a character in a ction and indeed, one must at least make
the moral judgment that some character is a villain or is undeserving of their cruel
treatment in order to appreciate the drama of the ction, and yet these sort of moral
judgments are properly restricted to something within the work.[11] Drawing on
Shelley’s essay, “A Defence of Poetry,” they claim that we should distinguish between
moral imagination as a “capacity to imagine signi cant moral con icts” and the will to
act morally (§3). The former is relevant to one’s engagement with art while the latter is
not, according to Wills and Holt. More to the point, artists’ moral or immoral actions in
their private lives should bear no impact on our aesthetic judgment of their work.
However, Wills and Holt’s position is also limited as they admit of exceptions, though
the exceptions only apply to “extreme cases.” As they say:
We think this is the case when an artist’s vices are not ordinary vices of passion but have
a cold calculating aspect. The cool head and icy heart that plans a mass murder is just
what we do not want in an artist. The art of a Hannibal Lecter could be a triumph of
intellect in shaping intricate form, perhaps, but not of warmth or sympathetic
imagination. If a mass murderer or serial killer were also a ne poet, this total disjunction
would itself be a kind of ugliness or aesthetic imperfection. Art that ceases utterly to be
good thereby ceases to be art. Under this limitation no painting of a Hitler or a Hannibal
Lecter could possess an unspoiled beauty no matter how seemingly exquisite the
brushwork, although short of such extremes we seem permissibly able to value Eric Gill’s
sculpture and typeface. (§4)

Wills and Holt’s view of independence-with-exceptions is likely the default position for
many people when thinking about these issues. However, such a view is obviously
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untenable. If we assert an independence between aesthetic judgment and moral
judgment, then it is puzzling how one can maintain both independence as well as
exceptions. If there is no interaction between aesthetic and ethical values, as claims of
independence would maintain, then there is no logical space left to defend exceptions.
It is a poor autonomism that admits of exceptions.
In fact, it may be more accurate when thinking of Wills and Holt’s account to reject the
notion of independence entirely and instead think of their account as advocating for
aesthetic and ethical interaction, though one that sets the bar for moral criticism very
high. It is only truly horri c individuals–serial killers or mass murderers–whose work is
aesthetically marred by the immorality of the artist’s life. But then, if we are willing to
accept some interaction between aesthetic and ethical values, why set the bar that
high? Is there a principled reason for such a high boundary? A clue to this question is
found in Wills and Holt’s comments that such artists are incapable of “warmth or
sympathetic imagination,” while lesser crimes can be dismissed as matters of “passion.”
The works of Emperor Nero must be second-rate, they say, because of his inhumane
cruelty, while the poet François Villon deserves some sympathy: “Is it not plain that this
thief and scoundrel [Villon] wins our sympathy by being in the grip of self-destructive
passions and mystifying compulsions just as we ourselves too often are? A great sinner
can create great art, while an inhuman monster cannot” (§4). Ordinary crimes are
motivated by forces and passions that any sensitive person would be familiar with. So,
we should treat such artists with sympathy. But, the crimes of serial killers and mass
murderers leave their humanity unrecognizable. We cannot (or will not?) enter into
sympathetic imagination with the “cool head and icy heart” of sociopaths.
While we might accept the idea that the art of a sociopath is quite di erent from that
of an artist with more run-of-the-mill moral failures, we should still wonder about the
relevance of this di erence. Notice that the di erence, according to Wills and Holt, is
between according no signi cance at all to the moral failings of ordinary artists while
dismissing the work of sociopaths as no longer art. As Wills and Holt say, “Art that
ceases utterly to be good thereby ceases to be art” (§4). For Wills and Holt, it is all or
nothing. They o er no proportional weighting of an artist’s moral failures. Either you
are a sociopath who is entirely incapable of producing art or you are an ordinary
criminal, in which case your crimes lack any moral relevance to the evaluation of your
work.
Wills and Holt accept that some artists can be held accountable for their private moral
failings and, on this point, I agree. But where I disagree is how high the bar should be
set. They say, hold none accountable except for the absolute worst. We should ignore
completely the moral failings of Gill and Villon. But then, shouldn’t we also ignore the
crimes of Bill Cosby? This seems too generous. There are many crimes that fall short of
mass murder that still seem monstrous to me, for example, rape, child abuse, and sex
tra cking. Why should the art of ordinary monsters get a complete pass? Instead, we
should consider a proportional criticism of the artist’s crimes against the aesthetic
merits of their work.
4. The limits of ethicism
An in uential view of the ethical criticism of art is that o ered by Berys Gaut, according
to which, “the ethical assessment of attitudes manifested by works of art is a legitimate
aspect of the aesthetic evaluation of those works, such that, if a work manifest ethically
reprehensible attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically defective, and if a work
manifest ethically commendable attitudes, it is to that extent aesthetically
meritorious.”[12] While there is much of Gaut’s ethicism that is worthy of attention, I
will focus solely on three points that are relevant to our current concerns.
First, Gaut notes that works of representational art “manifest” attitudes as well as
“prescribe” both attitudes and responses. For illustration, consider a lm like Darren
Aronofsky’s Requiem for a Dream. The lm o ers a lesson in the various ways that
individuals can become enmeshed in a life of drug abuse. Throughout the lm, the
characters are shown getting high, committing crimes, and making bad choices. Certain
values and attitudes are manifested in the characters, both through what they say and
what they do. Those values and attitudes can be open to the viewer’s moral scrutiny
but, of course, viewers should not automatically assume that Aronofsky endorses or
wishes to promote the actions or attitudes of his characters. Requiem is not a work of
glori cation. Instead, it prescribes a critical attitude toward the actions of its
characters. It is central to Gaut’s ethicism that it is not the content of the work that is of
moral concern but, rather, it is the attitude toward that content prescribed by the
author. If one believed that Aronofsky sought to prescribe an attitude of admiration for
the self-destructive lives that his characters lead, then one would have some room to
ethically criticize the work. But this is clearly not the attitude prescribed by the work.
Rather, Requiem is a warning, though one that humanizes characters that all too often
are demonized. On this score, the lm would have an aesthetic credit in its favor.
Second, according to Gaut, works of art are made aesthetically better to the extent that
they prescribe morally praiseworthy attitudes, and they are made aesthetically worse
to the extent that they prescribe morally reprehensible attitudes. It is not an all-orhttps://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-869/
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nothing matter, rather it is pro tanto. Aesthetically evaluating works of art is a subtle
and complex endeavor that requires one to balance all aesthetically relevant features
against one another. Requiem for a Dream is again illustrative. The lm is harrowing. It
falls into the rare category of masterpieces that I never want to see again. What makes
the lm good is not just its cinematography, its editing, or its powerful acting.
Additionally, it is the delicate balance achieved by the prescribed attitude that neither
glori es drug abuse nor demonizes addicts. Its characters are recognizable people with
real humanity and substance. Yet, Requiem is also gruesome and deeply upsetting.
Each of these points must be taken together in an overall evaluation of the lm.
Finally, Gaut’s ethicism does not and need not demand an objective conception of
ethics. Though this point is often overlooked, an ethicist about art criticism could be a
thoroughgoing subjectivist about ethical values (and aesthetic values). One must only
remember that individuals have their own moral values, and individuals make both
moral and aesthetic judgments. Then, it is an open question whether one’s (subjective)
moral values ought to play a role in one’s (subjective) aesthetic evaluations. We can
adopt Gaut’s ethicism regardless of how we might think of the reality or subjectivity of
moral and aesthetic values.
Gaut’s view is a nuanced and sensitive account of how works themselves can manifest
attitudes that are open to moral evaluation. However, it cannot directly handle cases of
artists’ personal moral failings that we are considering here. The problem, simply put,
is that an artist’s moral failures are not manifested in the contents of his or her works.
So, Gaut’s account cannot get us the full way to our goal.
5. Expanded ethicism
Gaut’s view can be expanded to account for the cases we are after. To do so, I must
begin by stating some positions I take to be true about our aesthetic experience but
are not universally accepted. Still, these positions have been widely defended and will
likely be familiar to many.
I accept the following. All works of art are produced from a certain point of view. The
point of view that I have in mind is not what one might call the perspectival view of the
work. Many works of art have a point of view, in the sense that they present a
distinctive perspective. However, many others do not; think of abstract paintings or
pure music. By contrast, all works of art are produced from a particular socio-historical
point of view. It is this latter point of view that informs my account.[13]
Filling out the point of view of a work would be a very complex a air, but it would at
least include the socio-historical context that is relevant to understanding the artist’s
work. This may include not only art-historical information about the artist’s in uences,
styles, and their relationships to other contemporary artists, but also the social,
political, economic, and religious climate in which the artist was working and the artist’s
own beliefs concerning those. More importantly, the point of view of the work takes
certain values and assumptions as its norm. The values of family and middle-class
respectability that form the backdrop of Bill Cosby: Himself are never openly
announced to the viewer, just as the audience does not need to be explicitly told that
Darth Vader is the villain of Star Wars: A New Hope. Rather, it is assumed that viewers
will recognize such assumptions and values.
If the reader accepts the above, then the account I suggest goes like this. The point of
view for all works is underspeci ed. One cannot discern the socio-historical context of
the work just by viewing its surface, and it is often a di cult matter to uncover the
implicit values and assumptions of any work. Some additional study must be done
outside of one’s scrutiny of the work to fully understand and evaluate it, which typically
is part of the work of art critics and historians. To ll out the point of view of a work, it
is common to turn to biographical information about the artist. Certainly, this practice
is controversial, as can be seen by the ongoing debate over intentionalist theories of
interpretation.[14] However, it is not necessary to defend intentionalism here. The
general practice of looking to the artist’s biography, in order to uncover the implicit
assumptions and values of their work, remains a common art critical practice. Consider
two paintings by Jacques-Louis David, The Death of Marat and Napoleon Crossing the
Alps. How did a man who once painted images extolling the French Revolution come to
paint adoring images of Napoleon? Were David’s shifting political loyalties the result of
a sincere change in his views or were they simply the product of a cynical
opportunism? Insofar as our appreciation of David’s oeuvre is informed by the sincerity
of the values and loyalties that his works express, then the answer to such questions
lies within David’s biography, not within his paintings. But, at the point where some
research into the artist’s biography is needed, then we are already encroaching onto
the artist’s personal life. To adapt a point once made by Wollheim, if we allow ourselves
to consider some background knowledge from the artist’s life, then why stop short at
the artist’s own personal morality?[15] This seems like an arbitrary restriction on our
critical practices.
The prescribed attitude manifested by the work is a part of the work’s point of view,
according to Gaut. To know whether p is the prescribed attitude of the work, I suggest
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-869/
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that we may be required to look into the artist’s biography. For illustration, think again
of Requiem for a Dream. It seems likely that our understanding of the lm’s prescribed
attitude would be a ected somehow if we were to discover that Aronofsky was an
unrepentant drug pusher. Perhaps we would negatively view the work as insincere. Or,
perhaps we would positively view the work as a brave form of confessional. Regardless
of how exactly such information would impact our aesthetic evaluation of the work, the
point is that such information will have some impact on one’s evaluation of the lm.
Thus, we can adopt an expanded version of Gaut’s ethicism: A work of art is morally
awed to the extent that its assumed point of view is morally awed and a work is
morally praiseworthy to the extent that its assumed point of view is morally
praiseworthy. The artist’s own personal morality is aesthetically relevant to our
evaluation of their work because we may only come to understand the work’s point of
view, and therefore the work’s prescribed attitude, by examining the implicit values
and attitudes of the artist. For instance, Bill Cosby: Himself manifests an attitude that
appears wholesome. However, we now know that this point of view is incomplete. By
drawing on our knowledge of Cosby’s personal life, we must see his on-stage persona
as an insincere façade.
Finally, there are interesting cases where we seem to positively enjoy and evaluate
some works because of the artist’s moral aws. Such cases are likely very familiar: the
chauvinism of Ernest Hemingway, the cantankerousness of Charles Bukowski, the
licentiousness of Hunter S. Thompson. Notice that these are not cases where the
artist’s work is admired despite their moral aws, which the ethicist already can
address through the pro tanto claim, but are arguably cases where the work is admired
by virtue of their moral aws. These cases seem like a challenge to ethicism, and to my
expanded ethicism, because the view holds that moral merits are always aesthetic
merits while moral aws are always aesthetic aws. So, how can an expanded ethicist
explain these?
To do so, I want to distinguish two kinds of cases. The rst is what we might call the
counter-morality artist. For many fans of Hunter S. Thompson, his licentiousness is not
a moral aw but is, in fact, a point of admiration. Indeed, Thompson represents a
counter-culture, one that rejects the standard morality of mainstream society. Within
the values of the counter-culture, actions that are called “licentiousness” by the
mainstream are positively valued as a rejection of the standard morality. Interestingly,
in these cases the fan who aesthetically admires Thompson’s work because of their
admiration for his private life is doing exactly what expanded ethicism recommends.
Those traits that are seen as positive moral values in the artist’s life become positive
aesthetic values of the artist’s work. These cases of counter-morality are quite
common. For instance, some artistic genres view an artist’s immoral and illicit activities
as a positive sign of the artist’s authenticity, for example, in musical genres like gangsta
rap, punk, and narcocorrido.
The second sort of case is what we might call the hardship artist. The main
characteristic of the hardship artist is that the artist, in some way, deserves sympathy,
understanding, or forgiveness. It is not the artist’s moral transgressions that are
positively appreciated but rather the transgressions occasion a morally positive regard
for their hardship. Johnny Cash was both addicted to amphetamines and a devout
Christian. So, wouldn’t Christian fans morally fault his music because of his drug
addiction? In fact, no. Instead, Cash’s hard-living is viewed positively by Christian fans
as part of “his struggle,” and it is the struggle that such fans nd morally admirable.
These cases too can be explained by expanded ethicism. Fans of Cash aesthetically
admire his work partly because they morally admire Cash’s hardship.
I suggest that cases where the aesthetic value of an artist’s work is improved by virtue
of his or her moral failings will invariably turn out to be cases of either counter-morality
artists or hardship artists. Such cases can be handled by an expanded ethicism. Indeed,
our appreciation of both sorts of cases would appear meaningless, if it were not for the
fact that the artist’s private life indeed plays a role in the aesthetic evaluation of their
works.
Certainly more needs to be said. In particular, we should want to identify what sort of
factors about an artist’s private moral failings contribute to one’s understanding of
their work and how such private moral failings are to be weighed in one’s artistic
evaluation. While these questions deserve answers, it is enough for my purposes here
to demonstrate how ethicism could be expanded and therefore close the gap that has
been missing from the moral criticism of art.
6. Objections
Wills and Holt o er three potential objections. In this section, I will show how expanded
ethicism can address those.
First, Wills and Holt point out that moral saints are “vanishingly rare.” If we pause to
look closely enough into the lives of any artist, we will surely nd something morally
objectionable. Moreover, it is di cult to know where to draw the line. It is easy to be
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-869/
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morally outraged by artists who sexually abuse children or physically assault women
but, as they say,
…why restrict our judgment to these forms of criminality? Villon was a thief and
inveterate rogue. Nina Simone was a physically and verbally abusive parent. What about
Dostoevsky’s addiction to gambling? What about hard drugs? Are tax cheats, like Willie
Nelson, o limits? What about artists we enjoy but whose biographies we have not yet
read? Are we obligated to investigate their lives for potential crimes against women and
children? (§2)

The di culties presented by the need to be thorough are too great. So, their
suggestion is that it is better not to look.
This objection has some intuitive appeal–indeed, there are no moral saints–and yet it
poses no real challenge to the view defended here. The point of expanded ethicism is
not to dictate what sort of crimes matter, nor is it to determine what sort of ethical
values one ought to hold. Rather, the point is to defend the relevance of an artist’s
private moral failings in the aesthetic evaluation of their work. Are an artist’s moral
failings serious enough to warrant a negative appraisal of their work? That depends on
whether the artist’s actions con ict with one’s moral values and how strongly they
con ict. For some, Nina Simone’s parenting is a turn-o to appreciating her work while
others are able to tolerate and forgive. The example of Willie Nelson is instructive, and
is another example of a counter-morality artist. For many fans, his tax avoidance adds
something positive to his outlaw image. More recently, Willie Nelson has also emerged
as a defender of recreational marijuana use. This, too, is viewed positively by many of
his fans; he has become somewhat of a stoner hero. Are there some fans who,
disappointed by his tax avoidance and drug use, have sworn o their love of Nelson?
Almost certainly. But it is important to recognize here that the fans who positively
appraise Nelson’s music because of his transgressions are themselves drawing on facts
from the artist’s private life to evaluate his music, just like those fans who negatively
appraise Nelson’s music for the same private acts. Expanded ethicism goes both ways.
One may praise an artist’s work because one approves of the artist’s private life just as
another may condemn an artist’s work because one disapproves.
Second, Wills and Holt argue that the ethical criticism of artists would seem to ignore
the e ects of moral luck. They o er the example of many African-American blues, jazz,
and hip hop musicians–people facing oppression as racial minorities–whose crimes
may be the product of living in dire and unjust circumstances. As they say, “Bourgeois
liberal morality, admirable or not, may well be a luxury people from the underclass can
ill a ord, and the lives of many jazz and blues giants surely re ect this pressure” (§2).
Therefore, it seems wrong to negatively judge the quality of their work.
The spirit of this objection is admirable. We should certainly recognize the injustice that
drives many to commit petty crimes. But this too is not a reason to reject expanded
ethicism. There are two things to say in reply. First, moral luck is as much a problem for
morality itself as it is a problem for art. Moral luck is no reason to accept amoralism,
and so it is no reason to accept aesthetic autonomism, either. Insofar as any moral
theory must sensitively account for the e ects of moral luck, then so too should any
theory of the ethical criticism of art. Second, the version of ethicism that I defend here
is already sophisticated enough to admit the need for moral sensitivity. When taking
into account an artist’s moral transgressions, of course one would also take into
account the circumstances of those transgressions and the degree of moral
responsibility that the artist should be assigned. A work of art is an aesthetic failure to
the extent that the artist’s private life is morally condemnable. For those artists whose
moral luck has placed them in an impossible situation, we should aesthetically
condemn the work only to the extent that we would morally condemn the artist, which
in some cases may be not at all.
Finally, Wills and Holt observe that many are inconsistent in their judgments. Often we
are willing to condemn some artists for their personal failings while ignoring the same
moral failings in other artists. “Why,” they ask, “do many people who disdain the lms
of [Leni] Riefenstahl admire those of [Sergei] Eisenstein when both lmmakers
performed comparable services for their respective tyrants?” (§2).
In reply, we should rst wonder why this observation o ers a reason to reject the
ethical criticism of artists. While it is true that many people are inconsistent in holding
artists morally accountable, it is equally true that many people are inconsistent in their
moral judgments generally. Many of us employ double-standards, cherry-pick
examples, and willfully turn a blind eye when it suits us. Why should we think such
inconsistency poses a special problem for art? More importantly, however, we should
acknowledge that the inconsistency they draw attention to is not the fault of expanded
ethicism. There is nothing about expanded ethicism as a theory that invites such
inconsistency. The observation that we are often inconsistent should prod us to aim for
better consistency, not to abandon the theory entirely.
7. Conclusion
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Thinking back on how I have been trained to evaluate and engage with art, I feel as
though I have been taught to look the other way. And for many years, I did. We must
look the other way for the sake of appreciating the artist’s genius. After all, artists are
complex beings. Or so I was told.
I don’t want to look the other way anymore. Artists are not special, and neither is their
genius. We should regard the moral failings of artists in the same way that we regard
the moral failings of our friends.[16] Sometimes we regard our friends’ moral failings
as mere embarrassments or as regrettable stains on an otherwise brilliant person. At
other times, our friends’ moral failings are serious enough to call our friendship into
question. We may stand by some friends while yet feeling the strain of having to do so.
At other times, a friend’s moral failings may be so extreme that we denounce them. A
friend’s sense of humor, charm, and charisma may be only slightly diminished by his or
her possession of one moral blindspot, or may be revealed as a sinister façade. Our
regard for our friends is informed by our knowledge of their moral actions, and we can
do the same for artists and their works. By expanding Gaut’s ethicism, we can account
for the aesthetic relevance of an artist’s private moral actions in a way that is subtle,
that neither demands puritanism nor excuses insensitivity.
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